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Abstract 
The EU »economic constitution« systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-liberal 
direction.  Historically speaking, this was not the intent of the EU founding fathers.  The 
original constitutional settlement of embedded liberalism was significantly redefined in the 
next major revisions of the Rome Treaty.  The neo-liberal foundations of the single market 
and the EMU have imposed real and significant institutional constraints for progressive 
policy making. However, the role of the European Left was crucial in this alteration of the EU 
constitutional order. Despite the strong neoliberal consensus among the key political actors of 
that time, such a change would have not be possible without the Left' retreat towards »centre-
leftism«, particularly in France.  Furthermore, while constraints of the EU economic 
constitution are significant, we should avoid the »naturalization« of the EU project. The 
European Left, while in power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the EU economic 
constitution. The Left policy agenda remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation 
state.  The euro crisis pushed these developments even further and, for the first time in the 
EU history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance of the EU legal order.  The new 
Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered this constitutional balance. 
 
 
Keywords: Constitutional law, EU economic constitution, European left, neo-liberalism, 
Austerity Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana 
Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, Poljanski nasip 2, 1000 
Ljubljana, Slovenia tel: 386 1 420 31 76, fax: 386 1 420 31 15 Slovenia  
Email: Bojan.bugaric@pf.uni-lj.si 
   
Europe Against the Left? 
   4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract 
I. Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
II. The European Rescue of the Nation State .................................... 5 
III. From embedded liberalism to embedded neoliberalism? ....... 9 
IV. Divided EU Left and European Integration .............................. 16 
V. Toward European Austerity Union: EU Constitution after    
 the Euro crisis .................................................................................. 23 
VI. Conclusion: Constitutional limits to Progressive Politics? ... 29 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I have benefited from commentary and advice on earlier drafts from Daniel Brinks, Christian 
Joerges, Andrew Johnston, Floris de Witte, Jacques Ziller and other participants of the 
conference “Doing Law Beyond the State”, Research Methodologies in Comparative, EU and 
Public and Private International Law, School of Law, University of Sheffield, 18-19 January 
2013. 
Bojan Bugaric 
1   
 
Europe Against the Left? On Legal Limits to 
Progressive Politics  
 
I. Introduction 
At the moment, only seven out of twenty seven member states of the 
European Union (EU) are governed by left parties or left dominated 
coalitions.1 On the EU level, the Left fares even worse. The last European 
elections in 2009 brought the Left the worst defeat since the first elections to 
the European parliament in 1979.  The European Council and the European 
Parliament, two legislative bodies of the European Union (EU), are firmly in 
the hands of centre-right political parties, and equally is the European 
Commission, the executive body of the EU.     
Paradoxically, the European Left2 is on the wane precisely when the 'objective 
conditions' of the world economy seem to work for the Left. When the worst 
economic crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression hit Europe, many 
expected a strong comeback of the European Left. The economic crisis, 
ultimately the end result of neoliberal deregulatory ideology and policies, was 
rightly perceived as a great window of opportunity for the Left, which could 
not have been blamed for the disastrous consequences of neoliberal economic 
and political policies of the centre-right parties in power. Not only economic 
conditions but also favourable modernizing demographic trends are shifting 
                                                        
1 The Guardian, Left, right, left: how political shifts have altered the map of Europe, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jul/28/europe-politics-interactive-map-
left-right?INTCMP=SRCH 
2 By the Left I understand political parties which, comparatively speaking, on a left-right scale, 
more strongly support equality as a precondition for social change. Here I follow Noel and 
Therien's definition of the left-right distinction. See A.Noel, J.P. Therien, Left and Right in Global 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 6-10. I would like to thank  an anonymous 
reviewer for this suggestion. On the other hand, I do not try to distinguish between different 
»versions« of the Left.    
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the political terrain in favour of the Left.  The rise of a progressive younger 
generation, the increase in immigrant population, the growth of the 
professional class and the increasing social weight of single and alternative 
households and growing religious diversity and secularism, combined with 
the Left traditional base among the working class, makes them 'the natural 
beneficiaries of modernity'.3      
Yet, despite these favourable socioeconomic conditions, the European Left has 
failed to persuade the voters. The European Left not only suffered some of the 
worst electoral defeats in the recent history, it also does not seem to possess a 
convincing political program offering a credible alternative to the centrist 
pragmatism of European centre-right parties. As the EU is facing its most 
serious institutional and political crisis since its inception, the European Left 
is notably absent from public debate on how to solve the Eurozone debt crisis. 
Politically weakened, the European Left is on defensive and instead of 
offering solutions, it reacts to the new politics of fiscal austerity and balanced 
budget fundamentalism of the centre-right parties.   
Since the start of the euro-zone crisis in 2010, governments across the 
continent have responded by imposing fiscal austerity.  The new politics of 
fiscal austerity do not mean only double digit cuts of governments' spending 
but also the elevation of the austerity paradigm of the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel to the status of 'unbreakable law'. The new Fiscal compact, an 
intergovernmental treaty signed by all EU members but the UK and the 
Czech Republic, basically outlaws Keynesianism and its counter-cyclical 
economic policies and constitutionalizes austerity and balanced budgets as 
new fundamental principles of the EU constitutional order. As Newman 
sarcastically argues, such developments should make Tea Party loyalists in 
                                                        
3 M.Browne, J.Halpin, R.Teixeira, 'The European Paradox', Center for American Progress, 
September 2009, 1. 
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the United States green with envy.4  He elaborates that the politics of fiscal 
austerity will transform Europe's political economy in the long term, 
strengthening the neoliberal ideas of limited government and loosely 
regulated markets while simultaneously precluding any alternative social-
democratic framework.   
What these new developments offer is a new perspective on the political 
economy of the EU integration. If only four decades ago it was still possible to 
ask whether the Left should be against Europe5, today the question has to be 
reframed: is Europe, its politico-legal framework, working against the Left? Is 
the European Left confronted with a distinct constitutional order, which, 
because of its pro-market neoliberal bias, radically limits the ability of the Left 
to pursue its political programme? As Perry Anderson reminds us, it was 
Friedrich von Hayek who basically foresaw a development of a constitutional 
structure of an inter-state federation which would structurally limit the ability 
of electorates to enact dirigiste and redistributive policies.6 The major obstacle 
that such interstate federation would erect against pursuing redistributive 
polices is the lack of international solidarity required to sustain such policies.7 
When compared with the most recent political developments in the EU, 
Hayek's words from 1939 look like a prophecy.     
During the last two decades the EU evolved into a new kind of political order 
making it difficult to pursue a genuine Left political agenda. Namely, the EU 
entered a new phase of integration which has radically transformed the EU 
capacity to combine liberalism of common economic market with 
redistributive social policies either on the national or the EU level. As Höpner 
                                                        
4 A.Newman, 'Austerity and the End of the European Model: How Neoliberals Captured the 
Continent', May 1, 2012, available at  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137611/abraham-
newman/austerity-and-the-end-of-the-european-model 
5 T.Nairn, 'The Left Against Europe?', (1972)  I/75 New Left Review 5-120. 
6 P.Anderson, The New Old World  ( Verso, 2010), at 64-65. 
7 F.A.Hayek, 'The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism', in F.A. Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order ( Routledge &Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), at 266.  
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and Schäfer argue, the EU has come closer to Hayeks' neoliberal vision of 
inter-state federation than to the socially embedded liberal economic regime 
as envisaged by its founding fathers.8  Their vision, codified in the first EU 
Treaty in 1957, was somehow different. As most convincingly shown by 
historian Milward, the original constitutional settlement represented a 
compromise between international free trade and domestic state 
interventionism, a European version of what has later to become known as 
'embedded liberalism'.9  
Nowadays, important economists, political scientists and lawyers write about 
a 'political trilemma' of the EU making it difficult10 if not structurally 
impossible11 to combine common economic market and redistributive social 
policies on the EU level. In its most extreme form, the argument about the 
neoliberal bias of European constitutional order postulates that it is 
structurally impossible to develop an EU version of social market economy. 
Fritz Scharpf, one of leading scholars of European integration, argues that  
the socio-economic asymmetry of European law is caused by structural 
conditions whose effect does not depend on the ideological orientations of 
members of the Court or the Commission. For this same reason, it can hardly 
be corrected through changes in the party-political composition of the Council 
or through elections to the European Parliament.12   
According to this theory, the law, in the form of the European constitution, 
determines the politics of the European Union. The European Constitution, a 
                                                        
8 M.Höpner, A.Schäfer, 'Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a 
Hayekian Setting', (2012) 66 International Organization 429.  
9 J.G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the 
postwar economic order', (1982) 36 International Organization 392. 
10 D.Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy ( W.W. 
Norton &Company, 2011), at 220;  K.H. O’Rourke,  'A Tale of Two Trilemmas', March 2011, 
Department of Economics and IIIS, Trinity College Dublin, 3. 
11 F.W.Scharpf, 'The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a “social 
market economy”', (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 243. 
12 ibid, 243. 
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legal superstructure, has, so to speak, a life of its own and crucially 
determines the base, the relations of production.  In other words, the 
European Left is confronted with a distinct EU constitutional order, which, 
because of its neoliberal bias, radically limits the importance of the Left's 
political agenda.  
While in broad terms sympathetic to this powerful theory, this article offers 
an alternative explanation for the fundamental asymmetry between the neo-
liberal and social agenda in the EU legal order. The crucial reason for the 
absence of more developed 'social Europe' is not only the structure of the EU 
constitutional order as such but also the reluctance and inability of the Left to 
'Europeanize' its social agenda.13 The Left thinking and policy proposals 
concerning 'social Europe' have remained firmly embedded in the logic of the 
nation state. The Left urgently needs a new post-national approach to 'social 
Europe'.   
In the first four sections of the article I chronicle four different episodes of the 
institutional settlement between the market and the social in the EU legal 
order. In the last section I discuss policy alternatives to the current austerity 
approach to the euro crisis.  
 
II. The European Rescue of the Nation State   
The relationship between the European Left and European integration was 
always a complex one. The European Economic Community (EEC), from its 
inception, was not a Left project. George Ross argues that the real movers of 
European integration were Centre-Right Christian Democrats, who were 
                                                        
13 G.Moschonas, 'When institutions matter: the EU and the identity of social democracy', (2009) 
17/2 Renewal 13. 
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haunted by World War II.14 The European Left of that era was more focused 
on national systems of economic and political development and was not very 
enthusiastic about European integration. However, with the exception of the 
two largest Communist parties (PCF and PCI), other socialist or social-
democratic parties in principle did not oppose the project of European 
integration.15 As mostly opposition parties, they did not leave their imprint on 
the construction of an integrated Europe. Their primary concern was to keep 
the welfare state and its redistributive policies firmly within the jurisdiction of 
the nation state.   
A constitutional compromise reached during the negotiations leading to the 
Treaties of Rome was to decouple economic integration from social protection 
issues.16 Whereas the first was constitutionalised in the 'economic 
constitution', 'the social' was put on a separate track and remained mostly 
national.17 This fact is often overlooked by those accounts which argue that 
the Treaties of Rome represented an overwhelming victory of neo-liberalism 
over the French attempt to institutionalize a more regulated Europe.18 In 
reality, both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats were, although for 
different reasons, strong supporters of the welfare state. Hence, both camps 
have their own reasons not to transfer social policy to the European level.19   
                                                        
14 G.Ross, 'European Center-Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration', in J. Cronin, G.Ross, 
J.Shoch (eds), What’s Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times, (Duke 
University Press, 2011), at 321. 
15 D.Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century   
(The New Press, 1996), at 229. 
16 F.W.Scharpf, 'The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity', (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 646. 
17 C.Joerges, 'Rechstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European 
Integration Process', (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology 70; A.S. Milward,  The European Rescue of 
the Nation State, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2000), at 216. 
18 M.A.Pollack, 2000. 'A Blairite Treaty: Neo-Liberalism and Regulated Capitalism in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam', in K.Neunreither, A.Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam: 
Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), at 271-272. 
19 P.Manow, A.Schäfer, H. Zorn, 'European Social Policy and Europe’s Party-Political Center of 
Gravity, 1957-2003', MPlfG Discussion Paper, 2004/6, 19; A.J.Menendez, A, 'The Existential Crisis 
of the European Union', (2013) German Law Journal, Forthcoming. 
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The Treaties of Rome thus represented a compromise between two different 
visions of European integration. On the one hand we find German 
ordoliberals, strongly represented in the German delegation, strongly 
favouring economic freedoms as the key instrument of integration, while on 
the other hand both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats embraced the 
vision of regulated capitalism at home combined with open trade on the 
European level, or the 'Smith abroad, Keynes at home' compromise. Such a 
constitutional compromise can also be explained by the fact the Treaties of 
Rome were signed in a particular socioeconomic context, i.e., during the 
golden age of the Keynesian welfare state.  As a consequence, the 
constitutional settlement codified in the Treaties of Rome can be best 
described as a model of embedded liberalism, which tried to accommodate 
open markets aimed at securing economic growth with domestic political 
intervention protecting 'societies from capitalism's destructive and 
destabilizing tendencies'.20  The first European constitution therefore 
consisted of rules written in the Treaties themselves and implicit rules 
excluding majority of social issues from the ambit of the EEC jurisdiction.21 
As the EEC during the first two decades did not evolve into more than a 
customs union, the national systems of social protection could expand 
rapidly. As a consequence, the European »economic constitution« could 
coexist easily with nationally based systems of social protection and 
development. While member states could gain from the advantages of the 
»common market«, at the same time, they were able to continue with the post-
war state led development of national welfare states. As argued by Milward, 
the aim of European integration was to 'rescue the nation state': 
                                                        
20 S.Berman,  'European Disintegration? Warnings from History', (2012) 23 Journal of Democracy 
7.  
21 S.Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), at 16. 
Europe Against the Left? 
  8 
The problem genuinely was how to construct a commercial framework which 
would not endanger the levels of social welfare which had been reached...The 
Treaties of Rome had to be also an external buttress to the welfare state. 22 
As long as this was possible, the Left did not have strong incentives to 
challenge the project of European integration.  Rather, the Left 'remained by 
and large a passive bystander, occasionally voicing criticism yet without 
challenging the project at its core'.23 In other words, even though the Treaties 
of Rome bore the strong imprint of economic liberalism, such framework was 
perfectly compatible, both for the Left and the Centre-Right, with nationally 
based welfare states.  
However, the turning point came in the 1980s. After the turbulent decade of 
stagnation and 'eurosclerosis', European integration gained a new momentum 
with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992. As argued by Moravcsik, both revisions of 
the original Treaty were the consequence of a broad political convergence 
among the key member states (Germany, France and Britain) towards the 
neoliberal goal of creating a single European market .24  The relaunching of 
European integration thus coincided with a major shift in the political 
ideology. The golden age of the Keynesian welfare state did come to an end 
and gave its way to a new powerful ideology - pro-market neoliberalism.     
 
 
 
                                                        
22 Milward, n 16 supra, 216. 
23 O. Cramme, 'The power of European integration: Social democracy in search for purpose', 
Policy Network Paper 2011, 5. 
24 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose& State Power from Messina to Maastricht  
(Cornell University Press, 1998), at 317. 
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III. From embedded liberalism to embedded neoliberalism? 
With both revisions of the original Rome Treaty, the European Union moved 
decisively into an economic and a monetary union. The SEA was followed by 
a massive program of EC legislation aimed at removing all non-tariff barriers 
to a »single market« consisting of free movement of goods, services, capital 
and people. By the target date of the completion of the single market, the end 
of 1992, 260 out of 279 measures listed in the White Paper had been adopted 
in the Council of Ministers, which represented 'a staggering 95 per cent 
success rate'.25  It goes without saying that such a result would not be possible 
without a major institutional innovation adopted in the SEA which 
introduced qualified majority voting for single-market measures. However, 
equally important was the neoliberal consensus among Thatcher, Kohl and 
Mitterand on the importance of the single market promising Europe 
economies of scale needed to compete with rival economies of the US and 
Japan (Moravcsik, 1991, 42).26 As both Moravcsik and Pollack argue, the SEA 
was 'a quintessentially neoliberal project' .27 At that time, centre-right parties 
enjoyed a strong majority across Europe.  
However, France, one of the key member states, was at that time strongly in 
Socialist hands. According to Ross, it was Mitterand's turn from failed 
domestic Keynesian policies to Europe which crucially contributed to the 
success of the single market project. Even though European integration did 
not begin as a left affair, it had been relaunched in the 1980s by an interesting 
coalition of Kohl, Mitterand and Delors, where the two French socialist 
                                                        
25 I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Integration, 3rd Edition (Oxford 
University Press.2011), at 159. 
26 A. Moravcsik,  'Negotiating the Single European Act', in R.O.Keohane, S.Hoffmann  (eds), The 
New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change  (Westwiev Press,1991), at 
42. 
27 Moravcsik, ibid,42; Pollack, note 17 supra, 273.  
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politicians played the leading role.28  With the single market program and 
monetary integration, both deeply liberal economic initiatives, at the heart of 
the relaunch, this new intiative helped to convert Europe to post-Keynesian 
outlook.  Hence, it was French Socialist's transformation from traditional post 
World War II Keynesian leftism to centre-leftism build around the new single 
market initiative which paradoxically made centre-leftism obligatory for other 
European Left parties.29  Since the SEA represented 'a massive advance' in the 
opening of the European markets30, the EC member states' autonomy in 
welfare issues was no longer secure. As the single market became almost a 
goal in itself, it was possible to argue that many social policy objectives 
represent non-tariff barriers to trade and as such violate the 'logic' of the 
single market. Consequently, during the next two decades, the EU was able 
vastly to expand the scope of the single market at the expense of the 
autonomy of member states to pursue autonomous welfare policies. 
According to Scharpf, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) role in this 
process is usually neglected by the literature explaining the success of these 
reforms.31 ECJ's early case law paved the way for a future reconfiguration of 
the original balance between the economic freedoms and social rights in the 
EU legal order.  Scharpf argues that ECJ rulings in two early cases, Dassonvile 
(1974)32 and Cassis (1979)33, crucially limited member states' discretion in 
formulating national policies and announced a new rule of mutual 
recognition34 which has »changed the bargaining constellation and incentives 
                                                        
28 Ross, note 13 supra, 323. 
29 ibid, 324. 
30 M. Gilbert, European integration, A Concise History (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers , Inc., 
2012), at 139. 
31 Scharpf, note 10 supra, 225. 
32 Dassonvile, C-8/74, 11.07.1974. 
33 Cassis, C-120/78, 20.2.1979. 
34 The principle was only encapsulated  in the Cassis ruling, but later explicitely formulated in the 
Commission's communication: Any product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member 
state must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any other Member State. See P.Craig,G. de 
Burca  EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edition (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 649; K. 
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that member states faces in the processes of European legislation. While in the 
past national law had remained in force as long as governments did not agree 
on a harmonization directive, the new default condition would be mutual 
recognition«.35 The paradox is that once the Court of Justice had established 
basic principles interpreting market freedoms in its own  particular way, 
political bodies of the EU, with their veto position being undermined, had 
little choice but to follow the court's case law. Subsequently, the ECJ had 
extended the reach of its early rulings from free trade to free services delivery, 
free establishment, free capital movement and the free mobility of workers. 
This led, according to Scharpf, to a highly asymmetric institutional 
development: legal integration (integration through law), developed by an 
ever increasing case law of the ECJ, outpaced political integration impeded by 
heterogeneous interests of the member states.36 Due to the 'peculiar 
understanding' of economic freedoms by the ECJ, where the priority is 
assigned to the rights of capital holders over the socio-economic rights37 
(Menendez, 2012, 70), the first asymmetry has also had a strong effect on the 
substantive direction of subsequent European legislation.38      
Unlike in the national constitutional setting, where national courts have to 
balance the importance of economic and social dimensions, treating them as 
having an equal constitutional status, in ECJ jurisprudence the social clearly 
remained subordinate to the economic.39 Although with time and new 
amendments to the original Rome Treaty the line between the economic and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Alter,  The European’s Court Political Power. Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
142, 143.  
35 Scharpf, note 13 supra, 224. 
36 As Gilbert argues, while Cassis judgment provided an important stimuls for reform, we should 
not overestimate  the extent to which the ruling opened the trade barriers within the EC. See 
Gilbert, note 29 supra, 131.  
37 A.J. Menendez, 'A proportionate constitution? Economic Freedoms, substantive constitiutional 
choices and dérapages in European Union Law', in E. Chiti, A.J. Menendez , P.G. Teixera (eds),  The 
European Rescue of the European Union? The existential crisis of the European political project, 
ARENA Report No. 3/12, RECON Report no. 19, at 70.  
38 Scharpf, note 13 supra, 225.  
39 Menendez, note 34 supra, 106. 
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the social has become blurred, it is important to emphasize that the social 
never achieved a constitutional parity with the economic. ECJ's judicial 
interpretation of market freedoms relies on various theoretical assumptions 
about the role of markets, governments and social policy in a market 
economy. The crucial flaw of the Court's doctrine lies in its orthodox 
subscription to a 'pre-realist' understanding of the market economy.  One of 
the key insights of American legal realists, later developed by a progressive 
left wing school of thought, Critical legal studies, was that markets are not 
pre-political structures with a single natural form but a product of 
public/political regulation.40 One important implication of this claim is that 
there are many different forms that market economy can assume. When the 
ECJ decides issues which involve balancing of conflicting interests protected 
by market freedoms on one hand and social rights on the other, it usually 
relies on a concept of internal market which strongly resembles the concept of 
a market criticized by American legal realists. Here, the market or internal 
market is constructed as a non-political structure which exists in a certain 
'natural' form where public regulation (in the form of social rights) only ex 
post facto changes the character of such a 'natural entity'. The Court's 
jurisprudence on internal market created a concept of market which became 
almost a goal in itself: 
The European Court of Justice is neoformalist in its interpretation of the 
canonical freedoms of movement of goods and persons in a »single market« 
in part, as is widely recognized, in order to drape its legislative power in the 
cloak of legal necessity.41  
                                                        
40 J.W. Singer, 'Review Essay: Legal Realism Now', (1988) 76 California Law Review 477. 
41 D.Kennedy, 'Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000', in D.M.Trubek, 
A.Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal ( Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at 69. 
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As a consequence, the 'economic constitution' was constructed as non-
political text juridified through supranational law, whereas social policy was 
conceptualized as 'a categorically distinct subject. It belonged to the domain 
of political legislation, and, as such, had to remain national'.42 Such 
depoliticization of EU constitutional law has had far reaching consequences 
for a future development of 'the social' in the EU constitutional legal order. 
The expulsion of the social from the constitutional level has paved the way for 
a particular juristic interpretation of the European constitution. According to 
Scharpf, it contributed to the fundamental asymmetry between market 
liberalization (negative integration) and social protection (positive 
integration) being now locked in the EU constitutional legal order. While the 
negative integration could be achieved quite easily, the positive integration 
was impeded by a 'joint decision trap' preventing governments to agree on 
common EU regulatory standards in crucial social policy areas. Hence, the 
reconfiguration of the original balance between the economic freedoms and 
social rights has been crucially shaped by the 'peculiar' judicial interpretation 
of core constitutional provisions (four freedoms) of the EC Treaty.43   
For Delors, the single market programme was only the first step in a more 
ambitious programme of integration.  He strongly believed that the economic 
liberalization programme would be followed by both monetary union and 
creation of 'social Europe'.44  
 While he was very successful in promoting common currency, his 'social 
Europe' idea was a gamble (Ross, 2011).45   
                                                        
42 Joerges, note 16 supra, 70.  
43 Barnard criticizes such 'market access' approach and argues for adoption of 'discrimination-
based' approach, modeled upon the US Supreme Court jurisprudence to the Commerce Clause. 
See C.Barnard, 'Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?', (2009) 68 Cambridge 
Law Journal 577. 
44 Bache, George, Bulmer, note 24 supra, 166. 
45 Ross, note 13 supra, 326 
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In unique historical circumstances, marked by the 'acceleration of history' ( 
the collapse of Communism, the end of the Cold War and German re-
unification), and with a support of the key member states, The Treaty on 
European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) was signed in February 1992. 
Monetary union was by far the most important single policy initiative in the 
Maastricht Treaty. Premised on the neo-liberal foundations, EMU 
substantially constrained the ability of member states to pursue fiscal and 
economic policies substantially different from the prevailing ordoliberal46 
orthodoxy of sound finance doctrine which found its place in the new Treaty 
provisions. EMU was embedded in a highly restrictive macroeconomic policy 
regime which was pre-Keynesian in its nature (Arestis, Sawyer, 2006; 6).47 Its 
key ingredients included the most independent central bank in the world 
(ECB) with the overarching emphasis on price stability and with an absolute 
priority of monetary policy which is taken as the main instrument of 
macroeconomic policy. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, was severely 
constrained by the rigid rules of the Stability and Growth Pact prohibiting 
member states from running excessive budget deficits and excessive general 
government debt. As explained by McNamara, the adoption of EMU followed 
a new neoliberal policy consensus which 'emphasizes the inherent stability 
and adaptability of the private sector and view traditional Keynesian efforts 
to manipulate the economy, particularly full employment strategies, as 
ineffective and possibly counterproductive'.48   
With ten out of twelve member states having conservative centre-right prime 
ministers, the broader neoliberal policy consensus about sound money 
                                                        
46 Ordoliberalism is a German version of neo-liberalism developed in the 1930s by the Freiburg 
School. See H.Rieter, M. Schmolz, 'The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-45: pointing the way 
to a new economic order', (1993) 1 The European Journal of History of Economic Thought  87-114. 
47 P.Arestis, M. Sawyer, 'Macroeconomic policy and the European Constitution', in P.Arestis, 
M.Sawyer (eds), Alternative Perspectives on Economic Policies in the European Union  (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) at 6. 
48 K. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Cornell 
University Press, 1998), at 145.  
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doctrine and with a strong support of business, Delors was able to push the 
EMU forward.  However, his 'social Europe' agenda was confronted with a 
strong neoliberal-nationalist coalition unwilling to follow Delors's proposal.  
Without the support of real political allies and 'swimming against the current 
of the neoliberal Zeitgeist', the Delors Commission counted on the neo-
functionalist logic of market integration to necessitate Polanyi’s counter-
movement leading to 'market correcting' Community institutions and 
policies.49 But, as it turned out, such neo-functionalist logic did not work as 
Delors wanted. As Streck has shown, a British led coalition between 
neoliberal advocates and other member states resisting harmonization easily 
defeated Delor’s initiative.50    
In other words, the original constitutional settlement was importantly 
redefined. The economic and the social, originally two parallel tracks, now 
started to collide. First, social protection policies at the national level had to be 
designed in the shadow of 'constitutionalized' economic law of the single 
market. Second, with the creation of the European and Monetary Union 
(EMU), member states not only lost its autonomous monetary policy but also 
agreed, through SGP, to important restrictions on their fiscal policies. Third,  
the EU accumulated substantial new jurisdictions in various social policy 
fields such as employment discrimination, equal pay, health and safety at 
work etc.  All these developments led to the creation of 'semi -sovereign 
welfare states' in a multitiered system of social policy, where member states 
                                                        
49 W. Streeck, 'From Market Making to State Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of 
European Social Policy', in in S.Liebfried, P.Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between 
Fragmentation and Integration  (The Brookings Institution, 1995), at 402. 
50 W.Streeck, 'Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?', in G.Marks, F.W.Scharpf, 
P.Schmitter, W.Streeck (eds), Governance in the European Union, London (Sage Publications, 
1996), at 75. 
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have lost more autonomy in social protection policies than the EU has gained 
in transferred new social protection authority.51  
Nevertheless, the new EU constitutional settlement after the SEA and 
Maastricht Treaty differs from the orthodox Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism. 
According to van Apeldoorn52, it represents a continental European-style 
neoliberalism which combines supranational marketization on the EU level 
with social elements on the national level, the latter being gradually hollowed 
out by the former. From a constitutional law perspective, it is important to 
emphasize that although the new embedded neoliberalism seriously 
challenges the constitutional balance between open market and social 
protection, it does not explicitly rule out progressive social policies. As we 
will see later, on this issue the Rubicon has been crossed with the EU response 
to the euro crisis.     
 
IV. Divided EU Left and European Integration   
The EU thus entered the next stage of integration with significantly altered 
original constitutional settlement. If under the Rome Treaty the social was 
constitutionally protected from the economic, after the SEA and the 
Maastricht Treaty it had to confront the expansive logic of the internal market 
and the constraining logic of the EMU. Bolstered with the activist 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the economic constitution gradually 
started to encroach upon the social, making the latter derivative of and 
                                                        
51 S. Liebfried, P.Pierson, 'Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe', in 
S.Liebfried, P.Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (The 
Brookings Institution, 1995), at 44.  
52 B. van Apeldoorn, 'The Contradictions of “Emedded Neoliberalism” and Europe’s Multi-level 
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(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), at 24.  
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subordinated to the former.  The original balance between the economic and 
the social was changed so as to undermine the initial parity between the two.  
The Left was suddenly confronted with a new kind of constitutional order 
which clearly favoured the economic constitution of the internal market over 
social protection.      
As the original constitutional compromise begun to unravel so did the 
consensus among the Left and Centre-Right about the aims of the internal 
market. Between mid-1980s and mid- 1990s there was a broad consensus 
among the Left and the Right concerning the importance of the single  market.  
However, as the policy agenda shifted from creating the single market to the 
question of how regulated or liberalized the single market should be, the 
polarization along the Left-Right political axis has increased.53 The period of 
'permissive consensus' when European insulated elites could cut deals 
without a broader participation of European citizenry was then over.54 In 
these new circumstances, the volume of legislative acts adopted by the EU 
dramatically declined due to radically different positions between the 
European Left and Centre-Right on the substance of proposed legislation.55   
For example, when the Centre-Right Commission led by Barroso proposed a 
new Services Directive (2006)56 aimed at introducing the country of origin 
principle for services, the attempt of liberalization of services came under a 
joint attack from the French and German governments and many left-wing 
MEPs, who opposed the Directive on the grounds that it would undermine 
the high social standards that apply to most services in many member states. 
Opposing the Services Directive, the Left organized one of the first and largest 
                                                        
53 S. Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union & How to Fix It (Polity Press, 2008), at 32. 
54 L.Hooghe, G.Marks,  'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
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55 Hix, note 50 supra, 46. 
56 Services Directive, 2006. DIRECTIVE 2006/123/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
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demonstrations in the front of the European Parliament which helped to 
defeat the original 'neoliberal' text of the Directive aiming at full liberalization 
of services in the EU. After the ECJ issued a series of judgments in 200757 
concerning the impact of EU law on national labour law, the question about 
the compatibility of social rights with the EU economic constitution became 
even more pressing. As the ECJ ruled in favour of economic rights, there was 
a widespread perception that the EU economic constitution is threatening 
social policy by favouring economic integration.  
But if the EU constitution systematically biases policy making in the neo 
liberal direction, then the role of the Left in creating such order has to be 
critically examined as well. Any reflection on the nature of the European 
Union thus has to be also a critical reflection on the identity and ideology of 
the European Left. Namely, as I argued above, the European Left supported 
both the creation of a single market and of the EMU, which were crucial 
changes to the original Rome Treaty.   
From this perspective, it is interesting to examine how the European Left 
responded to the described erosion of social rights under the EU economic 
constitution. In the late 1990s, when 13 out of 15 member states were ruled by 
social democrats, the European Left enjoyed a unique period of strong social 
democratic hegemony in the EU politics.58 As we will see, social democrats 
failed to use this unique historic period to lock in a social democratic 
perspective into the EU constitutional order. Although often described as a 
modest Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam nonetheless represented a unique 
                                                        
57 ECJ, Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. 
Viking Line ABP, OÜ VikingLine Eesti, ECR 2007, I-10779; ECJ, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri 
Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECR 2007, I-11767; ECJ, Case C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt 
Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, ECR 2008, I-01989. 
58 As Streeck explains, the first attempt to create a comprehensive social policy at European level 
happened in the early 1970s and was largely driven by social.democratic governments to be in 
power in the key countries at that time. However,  the Social Action Programme of 1972 was 
easily defeated by a  British led coalition between neoliberals and nationalist resistance to 
harmonization. See Streeck, note 47 supra, 158. 
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opportunity for the Left to constitutionalize their social democratic agenda 
and thus re-balance the dominant neoliberal thrust  of the previous two 
Treaty changes.  
However, at the meeting of socialist leaders in Malmö, shortly before the 
Amsterdam Council, it became clear that the diversity of views within the 
European Left was so big that it prevented a concerted Left approach in the 
negotiations leading to Amsterdam Treaty.59 While the newly elected French 
prime minister Jospin attacked the neoliberal and monetarist thrust of 
European integration and demanded a social democratization of the EMU, the 
British Prime minister Blair presented his own, a 'third way' version of 
European social democracy strongly opposed to any idea of binding 
regulation and intervention in employment policy at the European level.60 By 
introducing and expanding the EU competences in employment, social policy, 
equal opportunities, environmental protection, consumer protection and 
human rights, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was definitely 'an outlier' in 
comparison with other Treaties, focusing more exclusively on neo-liberal 
agenda of creation of a unified single market. But on the other hand, it felt 
short of constitutionalizing an alternative social democratic EU agenda. 
Although the new Employment Chapter and a modernized Social Chapter 
represented important change of the EU economic constitution, formally 
making a high level of employment an EU constitutional objective, Blair 
together with Kohl blocked any attempt to grant the EU any significant or 
regulatory powers in this area.61 Instead, the Treaty accepted Blair's version of 
'voluntaristic' approach relying entirely on coordination and monitoring of 
national employment policies.  The Left has thus has failed to use a rare 
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instance of its political hegemony to more radically change the neoliberal bias 
of the EU constitution.  
A similar story happened during the debates of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, a precursor to future Lisbon Treaty.  An important part of the Left 
again pressed for a constitutionalization of 'social Europe', based on truly 
federalized social policy and extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in 
the Council, but it was again blocked by a coalition of the right parties which 
were joined by the Nordic Social Democrats and Blair's Labour Party fearing 
that any extension of EU competencies might undermine their national 
welfare models. 62 As Ross argues, this can be explained by an established 
Euro sceptical tradition of many deeply social democratic lefts in Europe 
(Sweden, Denmark, Austria) strongly favouring protection of their own 
domestic welfare models.63 
What these examples clearly show is that while the European Left was 
definitely constrained by the asymmetric logic of the institutional order, 
which by the way the Left also helped to construct, there were other issues 
which equally if not more importantly than the legal structure contributed to 
the absence of a well-defined, concerted Left approach to European 
integration: 
Irrespective of the limits imposed by EU institutions on the left's influence, to 
have influence European lefts need to agree on what they want to do together. 
Here is where the largest problems for center-lefts arise.64   
It is only the diversity of views within the European Left that inhibits a 
creation of common EU agenda.  The fact that European social democrats did 
                                                        
62 D. McCann, D, The Political Economy of the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective 
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not have a common programme for economic regulation at the EU level is 
also explained by the 'fundamental failure of imagination'.65 For the most part 
of the brief history of European integration, the European Left remained 
imprisoned within the nation state logic of progressive social policy. The 
European Left never really developed a post-national, EU approach to social 
policy. It usually oscillated between the defensive approach of protecting 
domestic welfare states and by and large unsuccessful approach to extend the 
national model to the EU level.  Although these two approaches are quite 
different, they share one important thing: both use a nation state model of 
social policy as their preferred template for EU policy.  This predicament of 
the European Left is best explained by Amato, a former Italian prime minister 
and an academic: 
In the long history of social rights the workers and their organisations have 
been the promoters of their own progress and the more they have succeeded 
the more they have gained instruments for not just being promoters, but also 
co-decision makers of the steps forward. They are historically used to playing 
this role at the national level. For the future they have to get accustomed to 
play it more and more at the European one.66    
It is surprising how few ideas about alternative 'possible Europes' are being 
put forward. It seems that one of the major problems of the European Left is 
the lack of institutional imagination and programmatic thinking which could 
offer new ideas about alternative, possible Europes. The European Left must 
start to think how to transcend the 'false necessity' of European neoliberal 
constitutional order. In order to do that, it must also transcend the nation state 
approach to social Europe, which unnecessarily limits the range of options 
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available to the European Left to basically two main possibilities: either to a 
defensive strategy of the re-nationalization of social policy, or to a traditional 
social-democratic attempt to reconstruct a Keynesian welfare state on the EU 
level.  As Ferrera argues, there is a third option, promising to reconcile the 
social model centred on the welfare state with the political model centred on 
the EU model of multi-level governance.  The novelty of this approach is in its 
attempt to strengthen the national welfare state by its more effective and 
explicit 'nesting' within the overall institutional framework of the EU.67  
As the EU faces its most severe political and economic crisis since its 
formation, it becomes even clearer that the European left needs to rethink its 
approach to economic and social regulation at the EU level.  With several 
Treaty amendments and other 'turbo-speed' legislative activities aimed to 
solve the euro-zone debt crisis, the Right Centre coalition under a strong 
hegemony of the German Chancellor Merkel has fundamentally transformed 
the economic constitution .68  With adoption of the Fiscal Treaty, ESM, 
European Semester, Euro Plus Pact, Six Pack, this time, the EU risks 
undermining the 'substantive balance' between the market integration and 
social policy that sustains the legitimacy of the integration project.69   
While previous Treaty amendments tilted the EU economic constitution 
strongly into the neo-liberal direction, they nonetheless included legal 
provisions protecting redistributive autonomy of member states at the 
national level. This time,  the 'Union has been transformed into a political 
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system redistributing significant wealth within its territory'.70 For the first 
time in the EU history we see an emergence of a new economic constitution 
which explicitly entrenches one economic paradigm at the expense of other 
alternatives, with simultaneously dismantling the remaining protections of 
social policy autonomy of member states. This approach is not only 
constitutionally problematic, but also economically questionable.71 It threatens 
the very existence of the EU as we have known it. As Schmidt argues, at the 
moment only a renewed social democratic agenda can help to solve this 
problem.72       
 
V. Toward European Austerity Union: EU Constitution 
after the Euro crisis 
Confronted with the deepest economic and political crisis of the EU since its 
inception, European political leaders responded with a series of legislative 
measures aimed primarily to solve the euro-zone debt crisis. In the last two 
years, they adopted European Semester (2010), European Financial Stability 
Facility (2010), Euro-Plus Pact (2011), Six-Pack (2011), European Stability 
Mechanism (2012) and Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (a.k.a. the Fiscal Treaty, 2012).  The 
economic theory behind all these rules is that a profligacy of 'irresponsible' 
states and their public sectors is the main reason for the current euro crisis.  
Hence, the best approach to solve the crisis is to impose strict new rules which 
aim to discipline such 'irresponsible' countries. In other words, the imposition 
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of strict austerity through balanced budgets and stricter fiscal rules became a 
new dominant economic ideology of the EU current leadership lead by 
Merkel and Sarkozy.  
Despite the fact that the austerity approach rests on a wrong diagnosis of the 
euro crisis73, that it does not work economically and that it has strong negative 
economic and social consequences for indebted countries, it still remains 
virtually unchallenged 'official' economic doctrine of the current EU 
leadership. However, the elections in France in May 2012 brought to power a 
new Socialist president Hollande, one of the most vocal critics of the austerity 
in Europe.  With the euro zone debt crisis further deteriorating, other 
important institutions such as IMF and the US Treasury also voiced a strong 
criticism of the austerity orthodoxy and urged for a new pro-growth 
approach. As a consequence, during the June 2012 Euro Area Summit the 
debate shifted from austerity to growth and several EU leaders urged for a 
new growth pact to complement the Fiscal Treaty. However, while making 
certain important concession to the pro-growth advocates (Hollande and 
Monti)74, the conclusions of the Summit felt short of producing a more 
ambitious alternative to Merkel’s austerity policy. 
The politics of strict austerity has profound constitutional implications for the 
EU legal order. It represents nothing less than a fundamental transformation 
of the economic constitution.75  For the first time the substantive balance of the 
EU ensuring 'the relative neutrality'76 of the Union’s policies has been 
explicitly disregarded.    
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The Fiscal Treaty77, for example, basically entrenches a certain economic 
theory at the level of constitutional law requiring the signatories of the Treaty 
to change their constitutions, preferably, with new provisions of binding force 
and permanent character.78 In other words, the signatories of the compact are 
asked to introduce into their constitutions provisions which can’t be changed 
through regular amendment procedures.  As a consequence, the austerity 
policy of Angela Merkel thus achieves binding and eternal legal validity. 
While it elevates the austerity paradigm of the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel to the status of 'unbreakable law', it basically outlaws Keynesianism 
and its counter-cyclical economic policies. No surprise then that in the 
editorial, one of the leading constitutional journals in Europe concludes that 
the Fiscal compact 'strikes at the heart of the institutions of parliamentary 
democracy by dislocating as a matter of constitutional principle the budgetary 
autonomy of the member states'.79 In addition, the European Court of Justice 
was given new powers to determine whether the member states comply with 
their duty to introduce balanced budget rules into their constitutional legal 
order. Such new power represents unprecedented constitutional intrusion, 
since the European Court of Justice never had the power to interpret national 
constitutions of the member states.  
Other measures such as The Euro- Plus Pact and The European Growth Pact 
on the other hand explicitly suggest coordination and harmonization of such 
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contentious welfare issues as pension schemes, social benefits and 
employment policies.  Access to bail out funds, provided by EFSM and EFSF, 
requires prior ratification of the Fiscal Treaty and signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding which requires very specific and detailed reforms.   Financial 
aid to Greece and Portugal is conditional on VAT increases, pension cuts, and 
the liberalization of public services.80 The latest example of this new forms of 
austerity constitutionalism are 'Contracts for Competitiveness and Growth', 
proposed by the EU Commission. The main idea behind the Contracts is that 
the governments in trouble would get the EU financial support with 
temporary conditional transfers based upon previous agreement with the EU 
on the content of a policy agenda.81     
Another important feature of these new instruments is that they side-line 
national parliaments and empower technocrats and judges to decide whether 
the member states fiscal policies are in compliance with the EU rules.  Once a 
country is found in breach of these fiscal obligations, the Commission, the 
Council, and the ECJ have extensive powers of control and sanction over a 
member state fiscal policy. As argued by a prominent economist, 'the 
profoundly undemocratic nature this approach is clear- the unelected 
European Commission can “request” that the elected national parliament and 
government to change its budget'.82   
The new Austerity Union thus undermines the most fundamental principles 
of 'substantive balance' in the EU constitutional order.  These principles, 
enshrined in the original Rome Treaty, provided a workable balance between 
Union’s economic goals and national redistributive social policies. As I argue 
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in Section 3, this balance has already been redefined in the 1980s with the 
single market project and monetary union.  Nonetheless, the economic 
constitution of the Union has never so directly affected the member states’ 
autonomy in its redistributive policies as it does with the newly adopted 
constitutional components of the emerging Austerity Union.83 
In their critical assessment of this new model for the EU, Leonard and 
Zielonka argue that Europe needs a different model of integration to survive: 
To survive the crisis, European leaders should embrace pluralism, 
participation and solidarity rather than the technocratic centralism of rules 
and sanctions.84 
As Schmidt argues, it is quite clear that impetus for such a new approach will 
not come from the austerity camp.85 German Chancellor Merkel, Barroso and 
Van Rompuy, supported by a group of Northern countries, remain firmly 
devoted to their austerity approach. European left, on the other side, is 
politically weak and curiously absent from political debate on the euro zone 
crisis. Brown, Halpin and Texeira describe this situation as the 'European 
paradox', where paradox refers to the failure of the European left to capitalize 
on the strong association between conservative reverence for the unfettered 
market and the current economic crisis.86  As I tried to argue in this article, 
such a failure cannot be attributed solely to the constitutional structure of the 
Union.  The Left needs to offer a new approach to the EU economic and social 
policy making which transcends the limits of the nation state model.   
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Current EU crisis is thus both challenge and opportunity for the European 
Left.  By reforming itself, the Left could also offer a new vision for Europe.   
How well is the European Left prepared for such an occasion?  Despite the 
fact that all key positions in the EU are momentarily in the Centre-Right 
hands, there are some promising news. If there were elections tomorrow, the 
Centre-Left would for the first time win a majority in the European 
Parliament (Hix, Marsh, Predict09, 2012).87 The Party of European Socialists 
(PES), a coalition of the socialist, social-democratic and labour parties of the 
EU, came out with a new Socialist Manifesto 'For a European Socialist 
Alternative' (PES, 2012).88  By and large a response to the Merkel’s politics of 
austerity, Manifesto offers some proposals which signal a departure from the 
traditional Left EU strategy.  Several proposals from the Manifesto advocate a 
constitutional re-orientation of the EU, but, curiously, not towards a 
federalized welfare state. Although the Manifesto falls short of proposing 
needed radical institutional innovation, it contains certain elements that point 
in that direction. For example,  they propose 'an economic policy for the 
Union which places the economic and social objectives laid down in the 
Treaty (growth, full employment, social inclusion), at the heart of policy-making 
with just as much vigour and organisational firepower as that accorded to the 
objective of budgetary discipline'.89  Interestingly, the means to achieve this 
end (budget reform, European Project Bonds, promotion of social, 
infrastructure and sustainable development investment),  offer a new 
approach to 'social Europe' where the proposed European economic and 
social policy seeks rather to strengthen than displace various national models 
of welfares states and varieties of capitalism.  Nevertheless, in order to make 
the Manifesto a new platform for a common EU strategy, the Left need to 
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avoid some of the past mistakes.  Only a concerted, European response of the 
European Lefts offers a hope that they could reverse the course of European 
history and make the EU again, as it was in its early days, both the protector 
and promoter of European nation states.90   
 
VI. Conclusion: Constitutional limits to Progressive 
Politics? 
Constitutions in politically liberal nation states usually don't discriminate 
among different political ideologies.91 While constitutions impose certain 
limits on legislative politics, primarily through the protection of constitutional 
rights, it can hardly be argued that, on balance, they privilege one or another 
political ideology. The EU 'economic constitution' is, in this respect, different. 
It systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-liberal direction.  
Historically speaking, this was not the intent of the EU founding fathers.  The 
original constitutional settlement of embedded liberalism was significantly 
redefined in the next major revisions of the Rome Treaty.  The neo-liberal 
foundations of the single market and the EMU have imposed real and 
significant institutional constraints for progressive policy making.  However, 
the role of the European Left was crucial in this alteration of the EU 
constitutional order. Despite the strong neoliberal consensus among the key 
political actors of that time, such a change would have not be possible 
without the Left' retreat towards 'centre-leftism', particularly in France.  
Furthermore, while constrains of the EU economic constitution are significant, 
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we should avoid the 'naturalization' of the EU, 'depicting it as an automatic 
upshot of a wholly impersonal logic'.92 As Rosemond argues, such view 
downplays the contingency of such logic .93 The European Left, while in 
power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the EU economic constitution.  
Despite certain quite important achievements (Employment Chapter, Social 
Chapter, equal protection, environment, health and safety), the Left failed to 
promote a coherent EU approach to 'social Europe'. The Left policy agenda 
remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation state.  The euro crisis 
pushed these developments even further and, for the first time in the EU 
history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance of the EU legal order.  
The new Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered this 
constitutional balance.  The new politics of austerity is both politically and 
economically flawed. It threatens the very foundations of European 
integration. The euro crisis thus represents both a challenge and opportunity 
for the Left to offer an alternative response to the biggest EU crisis since its 
inception. But in order to succeed, the European Left must first reform itself.  
The PES Manifesto is a promising sign in that direction.       
                                                        
92 C.Hay, D. Wincott, The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), at 132.  
93 B. Rosemond, 'Imagining the European Economy: Competitiveness and the Social Construction 
of “Europe” as an Economic Space', (2002) 7 New Political Economy  157-177. 
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